Capacities and Games on Lattices: A Survey of Result by Grabisch, Michel
Capacities and Games on Lattices: A Survey of Result
Michel Grabisch
To cite this version:
Michel Grabisch. Capacities and Games on Lattices: A Survey of Result. International Journal
of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems, World Scientific Publishing, 2006, 14
(4), pp.371-392. <10.1142/S0218488506004084>. <halshs-00179830>
HAL Id: halshs-00179830
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00179830
Submitted on 12 Nov 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
ha
lsh
s-
00
17
98
30
, v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
2 
N
ov
 2
00
7
Capacities and Games on Lattices:
A Survey of Results
Michel GRABISCH
Universite´ Paris I - Panthe´on-Sorbonne
Michel.Grabisch@lip6.fr
November 16, 2007
Abstract
We provide a survey of recent developments about capacities (or fuzzy
measures) and ccoperative games in characteristic form, when they are de-
fined on more general structures than the usual power set of the universal
set, namely lattices. In a first part, we give various possible interpreta-
tions and applications of these general concepts, and then we elaborate
about the possible definitions of usual tools in these theories, such as the
Choquet integral, the Mo¨bius transform, and the Shapley value.
Keywords: capacity, fuzzy measure, game, lattice, Choquet integral, Shapley
value
1 Introduction
Among the recent advances in capacity (or fuzzy measures) and cooperative
game theory, a notable fact is the emergence of new notions of capacities and
games which are defined on more general structures than the usual Boolean
lattice of the subsets of the universal set. Apart of the mathematical interest
brought by such works, the main motivation lies in an attempt to model the
real world in a more accurate way.
As it is often the case with generalizations, the main difficulty is to find the
right definitions for the usual tools and concepts used in the theory. Concerning
capacity theory, fundamental concepts are the Choquet integral and the Mo¨bius
transform, while for cooperative game theory, the Shapley value and the core
are important notions.
Our aim is to provide a survey of recent advances along these lines. We
will see that, although the generalization of the Mo¨bius transform and Choquet
integral do not raise particular difficulties, a proper definition of the Shapley
value is much more a topic of discussion. We will address also the case of bipolar
structures, and show that these structures cannot be reduced to a classical lattice
structure, although they can be isomorphically mapped to lattices.
In all our discussion, we consider the universal set to be finite. We denote
it by N , and |N | = n.
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2 Capacities, fuzzy measures, games and the
like
Definition 1 A capacity on N is a set function µ : 2N → R+ such that
µ(∅) = 0, and A ⊆ B ⊆ N implies µ(A) ≤ µ(B). This last property is called
monotonicity.
Although the notion of capacity is usually attributed into our field to Choquet
[10], capacities arised from the problem of electric distribution and they have
been studied by many mathematicians before Choquet. We could cite for ex-
ample Florin Vasilesco [52], who surveyed the notion of capacities before 1937,
and Henri Cartan [8], who studied the capacities of compact sets.
A capacity is normalized if µ(N) = 1. In 1974, Sugeno proposed a similar
notion (up to some condition of continuity), which he called fuzzy measures [48].
Other names which are commonly used are nonadditive measures (Denneberg
[13]), and monotonic measures.
Definition 2 A transferable utility game in characteristic form or for simplicity
game, is a set function v : 2N → R such that v(∅) = 0.
The above definition is the central concept of cooperative game theory (see,
e.g., [14, 11, 3, 44]). The only difference between games and capacities is that
monotonicity is dropped for the former. Hence monotonic games coincide with
capacities, and non monotonic fuzzy measures, a term which is sometimes used,
coincide with games. In the sequel, notation v implicitely designates a game,
while µ refers to a capacity.
Given a subset A ⊆ N , the precise meaning of the quantity µ(A) or v(A)
depends on the kind of the intended application or domain, in fact essentially
what the universal set N is supposed to represent.
• N is the set of states of nature. Then A ⊆ N is an event, and µ(A)
is the degree of certainty, belief, etc., that A contains the true state of the
world. We are here in decision under uncertainty or under risk.
• N is the set of criteria, or attributes, or sources. Then A ⊆ N is a
group of criteria (or attributes, sources), and µ(A) is the degree of impor-
tance of A for making decision. Corresponding domains are multicriteria
decision making, multiattribute utility theory, multiattribute classifica-
tion, data fusion, etc. In the framework of multicriteria decision making,
it is possible to give a more precise definition for µ(A): it is the overall
score of an alternative having score = 1 (maximal) for all criteria in A,
and 0 (minimal) for other criteria [30, 39]. This kind of interpretation can
be carried on other domains as well.
• N = set of voters. Then A ⊆ N is called a coalition, and v(A) = 1 iff
the bill passes when coalition A votes in favor of the bill, and v(A) = 0
else.
• N = set of political parties. Then A ⊆ N is called a coalition, and
v(A) = 1 iff the coalition of parties wins the election, and v(A) = 0 else.
These two last examples are a subdomain of cooperative game theory,
called voting games.
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• N = set of players, agents, companies, etc. Then A ⊆ N is also
called a coalition, and v(A) is the worth (payoff, income, etc.) won by
A if all players in A agree to cooperate, and the other ones do not. The
concerned domain is cooperative game theory.
3 Generalizations of games and capacities
3.1 Motivations
A first question is:
Why do we need generalizations of classical games and capacities?
The answer to this question is simply that we need them in order to model
reality in a more accurate way. Let us elaborate on this, and distinguish several
cases.
• A first situation is that some subsets of N may be not meaningful, so
that the structure is no more the Boolean lattice 2N of all subsets of N ,
but a subcollection of it. More specifically, when N is the set of states
of nature, some events may be not observable or not meaningful. Note
that in probability theory, it is the usage to define probabilities on algebras
(families of subsets closed under unions and complement), not on the whole
power set. In the case of political parties, it means that some coalitions
of parties are unlikely to occur, or even impossible (coalitions mixing left
and right parties). When N is the set of voters, it means that some voting
situations (i.e., the set of voters voting in favor) are unlikely to occur or
impossible. Lastly, when N is the set of players in a general sense, it may
happen that some coalitions are infeasible, for some reasons depending on
the precise meaning attached to players (e.g., competitive companies for
which it is impossible to cooperate).
• A second possibility is that subsets of N may be not “black and white”,
which means that the membership of an element to N may be not simply
resume to a matter of member or nonmember. This is the case with
multicriteria decision making when underlying scales are bipolar, i.e., a
central value exists on each scale, which is a demarcation between values
considered as “good”, and values considered as “bad”, the central value
being neutral. When building the model, we must then distinguish for
a given alternative criteria which have a good value, from those which
have a bad value (or a neutral one). In voting games, it is convenient
to consider that players may also abstain, hence each voter has three
possibilities, so that giving only the set of voters voting in favor is not
enough to describe the voting situation (ternary voting games). When N
is the set of players, one may consider that each player can play at different
levels of participation, ranging from no participation to full participation.
If there is a finite number of such participation levels, it corresponds to
multichoice games, when a degree of participation is defined on [0, 1], it
corresponds to fuzzy games.
• A last possibility is that, after all, elements of interest may be not subsets
of N . Global games work on partitions of players, not on coalitions, while
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games in partition function form and global coalitional games work on the
set of partitions and coalitions together.
3.2 Examples of generalized games
Let us introduce main examples of games defined on more general structures.
Games on convex geometries (Bilbao 1998) [2, 4, 3]: a collection L of
subsets of N is a convex geometry if it contains the empty set, is closed under
intersection, and S ∈ L, S 6= N implies that it exists j ∈ N \ S such that
S ∪ j ∈ L. Then, v : L → R is a game on convex geometry L if v(∅) = 0.
Convex geometries are dual of antimatroids (see, e.g., [38]), and Bilbao studied
also games defined on matroids [3], which are an abstraction of independent
systems (see again [38]).
Games with precedence constraints (Faigle 1989) [16, 17]: N being the
set of players, let us define a partially ordered set P := (N,≤), where ≤ is a
relation of precedence among players: i ≤ j if the presence of j enforces the
presence of i in any coalition S ⊆ N . Hence, a valid coalition of P is a subset
S of N such that i ∈ S and j ≤ i entails j ∈ S.
Ternary voting games (Felsenthal and Machover 1997) [18]: a ternary
voting game is a voting game where each voter i ∈ N may vote in favor, against
or abstain. Hence, a voting situation is denoted (A,B), where A is the set of
voters voting in favor, and B those voting against. Introducing the notation
Q(N) := {(A,B) | A,B ⊆ N,A ∩B = ∅} (1)
which represents the set of all voting situations, a ternary voting game is a
function v : Q(N)→ {−1, 1}. v(A,B) = 1 iff the bill passes in voting situation
(A,B), v(A,B) = −1 iff the bill is rejected.
Another way of denoting a situation (A,B) is to use a vector notation x ∈
{−1, 0, 1}n defined as follows:
(A,B) ∈ Q(N) ∼= x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n, with xi =

1, if i ∈ A
−1, if i ∈ B
0, else.
(2)
Hence Q(N) ∼= {−1, 0, 1}n ∼= 3N .
Bi-cooperative games (Bilbao 2000) [3]: they can be seen as a general-
ization of ternary voting games, like voting games are generalized to (classical)
cooperative games. In such games, each player i ∈ N may play as a defender,
a defeater, or does not participate. A bi-coalition (A,B) ∈ Q(N) represents a
situation where A is the defending coalition, and B the opponent coalition. A
bi-cooperatice game is a function v : Q(N) → R such that v(∅, ∅) = 0. v(A,B)
is the payoff of the game in situation (A,B).
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Multichoice games (Hsiao and Raghavan 1993) [35]: each player i ∈ N
has at disposal a totally ordered set of levels of participation labelled 0, 1, . . . ,m,
where 0 indicates no participation, and m full participation. A coalition is
replaced by a profile of participation x ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}n, where xi is the level of
participation of player i. A multichoice game is a function v : {0, 1, . . . ,m}n →
R such that v(0, . . . , 0) = 0. The quantity v(x) is the payoff of the game for
profile x.
Fuzzy games (Aubin, 1981) [1]: each player has a membership degree in
a coalition, considered as a fuzzy set. It can be seen as a multichoice game
with a continuum of level of participations. Fuzzy games have been studied by
Butnariu and Klement [7], and more recently by Branzei and Tijs [6, 50].
Global games (Gilboa and Lehrer 1991) [21]: let us consider the set of
partitions of N , which we denote by Π(N). When endowed with the relation of
coarseness (i.e., a partition P is coarser than a partition P ′ if any set of P is
a superset of some set of P ′), the set of partition is a lattice (nondistributive,
but geometric). Figure 3.2 shows the lattice of partitions of {1, 2, 3, 4}. A global
game is a function v : Π(N)→ R.
1,2,3,4
12,3,4 1,2,34 13,2,4 1,3,24 1,4,23 14,2,3
12,34 123,4 134,2 13,24 124,3 1,234 14,23
1234
Figure 1: The lattice of partitions of {1, 2, 3, 4}
Games in partition function form (Thrall and Lucas 1963) [49]: in
these games, the worth of a coalition A depends on the other coalitions which
are formed, supposing the set of formed coalitions is a partition of N . For a
given partition P ∈ Π(N), a quantity v(S,P) is defined for any S ∈ P .
3.3 Examples of generalized capacities
There is much less examples in this category. Here are the few examples we are
aware of.
Bi-capacities (Grabisch and Labreuche 2002) [25, 25]: they have been
introduced in the field of multicriteria decision making. Let N be the set of
criteria. Each criterion i ∈ N is defined on a bipolar scale: a neutral level exists
(most often the value 0 is taken as neutral level), such that values above it are
felt as “good”, and values below it are felt as “bad” by the decision maker.
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Hence, 3 reference levels are needed to describe the DM’s preferences: the sat-
isfactory level (usually the value 1), the neutral level (0), and the inacceptable
level (usually taken as the value −1). Any combination of the 3 levels is called
a ternary alternative, denoted by (A,B): A is the set of satisfied criteria, and
B the set of unsatisfied criteria. Hence, Q(N) is the set of ternary alternatives.
A bi-capacity is a function v : Q(N) → R such that v(∅, ∅) = 0, and A ⊆
B implies v(A, ·) ≤ v(B, ·), v(·, A) ≥ v(·, B). If normalization applies then
v(N, ∅) = 1 and v(∅, N) = −1.
Although bi-cooperative games and bi-capacities were proposed indepen-
dently and in different domains, formally bi-capacities are monotonic normalized
bi-cooperative games.
k-ary capacities (Grabisch and Labreuche 2003) [24]: instead of consid-
ering 3 reference levels as for bi-capacities, k+ 1 reference levels are considered
on each criterion, their meaning depending on the application considered. k-ary
capacities correspond in fact to monotonic multichoice games.
4 Games and capacities on lattices
All previous examples of games and capacities are particular cases of games and
capacities on lattices.
Definition 3 Let L be a set and ≤ a partial order (antisymmetric and tran-
sitive) on L. (L,≤) is said to be a lattice if for any x, y ∈ L, the least upper
bound x ∨ y and the greatest lower bound x ∧ y always exist. ⊤ and ⊥ are the
greatest and least elements of L, if they exist.
Definition 4 Let (L,≤) be a lattice.
(i) v : L→ R is a game on lattice L if v(⊥) = 0.
(ii) µ : L→ R+ is a capacity on lattice L if it is a monotonic game, i.e. x ≤ y
implies v(x) ≤ v(y) ( isotone or order-preserving mapping from (L,≤) to
(R,≤)).
We denote by G(L) the set of games on L.
4.1 Some useful facts on lattices
We give in this section some basic results and definitions on lattices which are
useful for the sequel (for a good introduction to the topic, see [12]).
For x, y ∈ L, we say that x covers y (denoted x ≻ y) if x > y and there is
no z such that x > z > y. The lattice is distributive if ∨,∧ obey distributivity.
An element j ∈ L is join-irreducible if it is not the bottom element and it
cannot be expressed as a supremum of other elements. Equivalently j is join-
irreducible if it covers only one element. Join-irreducible elements covering ⊥
are called atoms, and the lattice is atomistic if all join-irreducible elements are
atoms. The set of all join-irreducible elements of L is denoted J (L).
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An important property is that in a distributive lattice, any element x can
be written as an irredundant supremum of join-irreducible elements in a unique
way (Birkhoff theorem):
x =
∨
i∈J
i, for some J ⊆ J (L) (3)
P ⊆ L is a downset or ideal if y ≤ x and x ∈ P imply y ∈ P . Remarking
that in a distributive lattice one can always write x =
∨
i∈J (L)|i≤x i, Birkhoff’s
theorem can be rephrased as follows: any distributive lattice is isomorphic to
the lattice of all downsets of J (L).
In a finite setting, Boolean lattices are of the type 2N for some set N , i.e.
they are isomorphic to the lattice of subsets of some set, ordered by inclusion.
Boolean lattices are atomistic, and atoms corresponds to singletons. A linear
lattice is such that ≤ is a total order. All elements are join-irreducible, except
⊥.
Given lattices (L1,≤1), . . . , (Ln,≤n), the product lattice L = L1×· · ·×Ln is
endowed with the product order ≤ of ≤1, . . . ,≤n in the usual sense. Elements of
x can be written in their vector form (x1, . . . , xn). We use the notation (xA, y−A)
to indicate a vector z such that zi = xi if i ∈ A, and zi = yi otherwise. Similarly
L−i denotes
∏
j 6=i Lj , while LK :=
∏
j∈K Lj . All join-irreducible elements of
L are of the form (⊥1, . . . ,⊥j−1, i0,⊥j+1, . . . ,⊥n), for some j and some join-
irreducible element i0 of Lj.
A vertex of L is any element whose components are either top or bottom.
We denote Γ(L) the set of vertices of L. Note that Γ(L) = L iff L is Boolean.
4.2 Games on product lattices
We focus from now on on a specific type of game on lattice, where the lattice is
a product of distributive lattices. The motivation for such an approach will be
given below.
We consider L := L1 × · · · × Ln, where L1, . . . , Ln are finite distributive
lattices. Each lattice Li represents the (partially) ordered set of actions, choices,
levels of participation of player i to the game. Each lattice may be different.
Let us show that most of previous examples can be casted into this frame-
work. If Li := {⊥,⊤}, ∀i ∈ N , then we get classical games on 2N . If Li =
{0, 1, 2}, ∀i ∈ N we obtain bi-cooperative games (however, see Sec. 10), and
ternary voting games on 3N . If Li = {0, 1, . . . ,m}, ∀i ∈ N we obtain multi-
choices games on (m+ 1)N .
One may wonder how the set Li of all possible actions of player i can be
obtained, and why it should be distributive. We consider that each player
i ∈ N has at his disposal a set of elementary or pure actions j1, . . . , jni . These
elementary actions form a partially ordered set (Ji,≤), but not necessarily a
lattice. Then the set (O(Ji),⊆) (i.e. the set of downsets) is a distributive
lattice denoted Li, whose join-irreducible elements precisely correspond to the
elementary actions, by Birkhoff’s theorem.
For example, assume that players are gardeners who take care of some garden
or park. Elementary actions are watering (W), light weeding (LW), careful
weeding (CW), and pruning (P). All these actions are benefic for the garden
and clearly LW<CW, but otherwise actions seem to be incomparable. They
form the following partially ordered set:
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W P LW
CW
which in turn form the following lattice of possible actions:
W
P
LW
LW,CW
Let us give now an equivalent view of games on lattices, which is due to
Faigle and Kern [17], namely games with precedence constraints. We recall that
a valid coalition of P is a subset S of N such that i ∈ S and j ≤ i entails
j ∈ S. Hence, the collection C(P ) of all valid coalitions of P is the collection
of all downsets (ideals) of P . It is known that the collection of downsets of a
poset is a distributive lattice. Take for example N = {a, b, c, d}, and a ≤ b, c ≤
b, c ≤ d as a precedence order (Fig. 4.2). Let us show that we can recover
a
b
c
d
a c
abc acd
ac cd
abcd
Figure 2: Exemple of precedence order (left) and the corresponding set of valid
coalitions (right)
our situation, considering that N is the set of players, and for each i ∈ N , let
Ji := {j1, . . . , jni} be the set of elementary actions of player i. We know from
the above that Li = O(Ji) for all i. We introduce now the set of virtual players
N ′ :=
⋃
i∈N
Ji (4)
equipped with the partial order ≤ induced by the partial orders on each Ji.
Then valid coalitions of (N ′,≤) in the sense of Faigle and Kern correspond
bijectively to elements of O(J1)× · · · × O(Jn) = L1 × · · · × Ln.
4.3 Roadmap
This general framework being established, we should re-build usual tools from
game theory and capacity theory for the general case of lattice structure. The
following concepts lie among the most useful ones:
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• the Choquet integral (capacity theory)
• the Mo¨bius transform (capacity theory), otherwise called dividends (game
theory); unanimity games
• the Shapley value (game theory, capacity theory)
• the core (game theory, capacity theory)
• the entropy (probability theory, hence capacity theory).
In the sequel we provide a survey of results on these topics.
5 The Choquet integral for bi-capacities
Let f : N → [0, 1] and a capacity µ. We denote for simplicity f(i) by fi, i ∈ N .
The Choquet integral [10] of f w.r.t. µ is defined by:∫
f dµ :=
n∑
i=1
[f(i) − f(i−1)]µ(A(i)) (5)
with 0 =: f(0) ≤ f(1) ≤ · · · ≤ f(n) and A(i) := {(i), . . . , (n)}, i.e., we have
applied a permutation on N such that f becomes non decreasing. The canonical
polyhedra of [0, 1]n are defined by {x ∈ [0, 1]n | xσ(1) ≤ · · · ≤ xσ(n)}, for some
permutation σ on N . Clearly, these canonical polyhedra partition the set of
functions from N to [0, 1] into simplices where the same “weights” µ() are used
in (5).
We recall the following result.
Proposition 1 Let F be a function on [0, 1]n, which is known only on the ver-
tices of the hypercube, and let us find a simplest linear interpolation to determine
F entirely:
F (x) =
∑
A⊆N |(1A,0Ac )∈V(x)
[
α0(A) +
n∑
i=1
αi(A)xi
]
F (1A, 0Ac),
where V(x) is the set of vertices used for the linear interpolation of x, and
αi(A) ∈ R, i = 0, . . . , n, ∀A ∈ V(x). Moreover, we impose that conv(V(x))
contains x, and any x ∈ [0, 1]n should belong to a unique polyhedron (except for
common facets), with continuity ensured (triangulation of [0, 1]n).
Then the unique linear interpolation with no constant terms is the Choquet
integral, and the triangulation is obtained by the canonical polyhedra.
Lova´sz [40], considering the problem of extending the domain of pseudo-
Boolean functions to [0, 1]n in a linear way (for this extension problem, see also
Singer [47]), incidentally discovered the formula of the Choquet integral. The
fact that the so-called Lova´sz extension was the Choquet integral was remarked
by Marichal [41]. The above result of uniqueness can be found in [28].
Let us apply the same interpolative approach to the case of bi-capacities.
The main idea is that for a given point x ∈ [−1, 1]n, it suffices to go back into
the positive quadrant [0, 1]n by taking the absolute value |x|, and there to apply
the interpolation formula (classical Choquet integral), but using vertices of the
original quadrant containing x. This leads to the following definition.
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Definition 5 Let v be a bi-capacity and f be a real-valued function on N . The
(general) Choquet integral of f w.r.t v is given by∫
f dv :=
∫
|f | dνN+
f
(6)
where νN+
f
is a game on N defined by
νN+
f
(C) := v(C ∩N+f , C ∩N
−
f ), (7)
and N+f := {i ∈ N |fi ≥ 0}, N
−
f = N \N
+
f .
A similar construction can be done for k-ary capacities [24].
6 The Mo¨bius transform
Following the general definition of Rota [45] (see also [5, p. 102]), we have readily
a definition for any game defined on any lattice, or even for games defined on
any partially ordered set, provided it is locally finite (i.e., any interval is finite)
and with a bottom element. Let v be a game on (L,≤), the Mo¨bius transform
of v is the function m : L −→ R solution of the equation:
v(x) =
∑
y≤x
m(y). (8)
The expression of m is obtained through the Mo¨bius function µ by:
m(x) =
∑
y≤x
µ(y, x)f(y) (9)
where µ is a function on L2 defined inductively by
µ(x, y) =

1, if x = y
−
∑
x≤t<y µ(x, t), if x < y
0, otherwise.
(10)
Note that µ depends only on the structure of (L,≤).
7 The Shapley value
7.1 The classical case
The Shapley value, or more generally the notion of value, is one of the most
important concept in cooperative game theory. A value or solution concept is
any function φ : G(2N ) −→ RN , which represents an imputation of income to
each player, supposing that all players will join the grand coalition N , so that
the amount v(N) has to be shared among players. The value is efficient if∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N). Among other properties or axioms values should satisfy,
the following ones are classical.
• linearity (l): φ is linear over G(2N ).
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• dummy axiom (d): if i is dummy for v, then φv(i) = v(i).
• null axiom (n): if i is null for v, then φv(i) = 0.
• symmetry (s): φ does not depend on the labelling of the players.
A player i is dummy if v(S ∪ i) = v(S) + v(i) for any S ⊆ N \ i. A player is
null if v(S ∪ i) = v(S) for any S ⊆ N \ i. Remark that a null player is such that
v(i) = 0, hence it is also a dummy player. Note also that the dummy axiom
is stronger than the null axiom. The Shapley value [46] is the unique value
satisfying axioms l, n, s and efficiency, and is given by
φv(i) :=
∑
S⊆N\i
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
[v(S ∪ i)− v(S)], (11)
where s := |S|.
An equivalent definition can be obtained in a combinatorial way as an aver-
age of the contribution of player i over all maximal chains in 2N :
φv(i) =
1
n!
∑
C∈M(2N )
[v(SiC)− v(S
i
C \ i)] (12)
where M(2N) is the set of all maximal chains in the lattice 2N , and for each
such chain C, SiC is the first subset in the maximal chain containing i.
The Shapley value can be also obtained through unanimity games and lin-
earity as follows. Unanimity games are closely linked to the Mo¨bius transform,
since any game v can be written as
v =
∑
S⊆N
m(S)uS (13)
where m is the Mo¨bius transform of v, and uS is the unanimity game centered
on S, defined by:
uS(T ) =
{
1, if T ⊇ S
0, else.
(14)
A natural axiom for the Shapley value of unanimity games is
φuS (i) =
{
1
|S| , if i ∈ S
0, else,
(15)
since only players in S have a contribution to the game, and all players in S are
symmetric (anonymous). By linearity of the Shapley value, we get
φv(i) =
∑
S∋i
m(S)
|S|
, (16)
which is equivalent to (11).
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7.2 The Shapley value for multichoice games
We shall examine in the sequel various propositions for a definition of the Shap-
ley value for multichoice games. We recall that L = L1 × · · · × Ln, and all
Li’s are linear lattices, denoted by Li := {0, 1, 2, . . . , li}, where 0 means non
participation. Elements x of L are called participation profiles, with xi the level
of participation of player i. (0−i, ki) is the profile where player i plays at level
k, the other ones not participating. We often write k˜i for (0−i, ki), and ⊤i for
li. Many different approaches exist, which do not coincide:
• approach of Faigle and Kern [17]
• approach of Hsiao and Raghavan [35]
• approach of Grabisch and Lange [22, 31]
Let us detail first the approach of Faigle and Kern. The basic idea is to
axiomatize the Shapley value for unanimity games, and then to apply linearity
(combinatorial approach). The expression is the following:
φvFK(ki) =
1
|M(L)|
∑
C∈M(L)
[v(xki )− v(xki)] (17)
whereM(L) is the set of maximal chains in L, and xki is the first in the sequence
C such that xki ≥ k˜i, and xki is its predecessor. Although the expression is
simple and appealing, let us remark that the number of maximal chains for the
multichoice case is:
|M(L)| =
(∑
i∈N li
)
!∏
i∈N (li!)
=
(
l
l1
)(
l − l1
l2
)(
l − l1 − l2
l3
)
· · · 1, (18)
with l :=
∏
i∈N li. For 5 players having each 3 actions, this already gives
(15)!/65 = 168, 168, 000. Also, some of the axioms proposed by Faigle and Kern
are not intuitive in a game theoretic sense (e.g., the hierarchical strength axiom).
The basic idea of the Shapley value of Hsiao and Raghavan is also to ax-
iomatize the Shapley value for unanimity games, and then to apply linearity.
The original feature is to put weights w1 < w2 < · · · < wl on participation
levels. The expression of the Shapley value for unanimity games they obtain is
as follows:
φuxHR(ki) =
{
wk∑
i∈N wxi
, if k = xi
0, otherwise.
(19)
The expression for any game is extremely complex and will not be reported
here. It has been proved that for no set of weights w1, . . . , wl, the values of H-S
and F-K always coincide [6]. Although the axioms are appealing, the resulting
formula is almost inapplicable. Also, the role of the weights w1, . . . , wn is not
clear.
We present now our approach. The main idea is to follow as much as possible
the original axioms of Shapley. We aim at defining a value Φv(ki) representing
the contribution of player i playing at level k vs. non participation of i. This
contrasts with the two previous approaches, which represent the contribution
of player i playing at level k compared to the situation where he plays at level
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k−1. For some k ∈ Li, k 6= 0, player i is said to be k-null (or simply ki is null)
if v(x, ki) = v(x, 0i), for any x ∈ L−i. Similarly, for some k ∈ Li, k 6= 0, player
i is said to be k-dummy (or simply ki is dummy) if v(x, ki) = v(x, 0i) + v(k˜i),
∀x ∈ L−i. Based on these definitions, we propose the following axioms.
• Linear axiom (L): Φv is linear on the set of games G(L)
• Null axiom (N): ∀v ∈ G(L), for all null ki, Φ
v(ki) = 0.
• Dummy axiom (D): ∀v ∈ G(L), for all dummy ki, Φv(ki) = v(k˜i).
• Monotonicity axiom (M): if v is monotone, then Φv(ki) ≥ 0, for all
k > 0, i ∈ N .
The next axiom is similar to the symmetry axiom. Since all lattices Li may be
different, a direct transposition of the classical symmetry axiom is not possible.
Let Γ(L) := {01,⊤1} × · · · × {0n,⊤n} be the set of vertices of L. We introduce
a subspace of G(L):
G0(L) := {v ∈ G(L) | v(x) = 0, ∀x 6∈ Γ(L)} (20)
• Symmetry axiom (S): Let σ be a permutation on N . Then for any
game v ∈ G0(L),
Φv
σ−1
(⊤σi ) = Φ
v(⊤i) (21)
where for any x ∈ Γ(L), xσ := (xσ1 , . . . , x
σ
n), and
xσi :=
{
0i, if xσ(i) = 0σ(i)
⊤i, if xσ(i) = ⊤σ(i)
(22)
and for any v ∈ G0(L), vσ is a game in G0(L) such that vσ(x) := v(xσ),
for any x ∈ Γ(L).
For example, if L := {0, 1, 2} × {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} × {0, 1, 2, 3}, and the permutation
σ is defined by
i 1 2 3
σ(i) 2 3 1
then (2, 0, 0)σ = (0, 0, 3), (2, 0, 3)σ = (0, 4, 3).
Next axiom is not in the original set of axioms of Shapley, and concerns a
kind of homogeneity of the structure of the Li’s.
• Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider v1, v2 on L such that for some
i ∈ N ,
v1(x, ki) = v2(x, (k − 1)i), ∀x ∈ L−i, ∀1 < k ≤ li
v1(x, 0i) = v2(x, 0i), ∀x ∈ L−i.
Then Φv1(ki) = Φ
v2((k − 1)i), 1 < k ≤ li.
• Efficiency axiom (E):
∑
i∈N Φ
v(⊤i) = v(⊤).
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Proposition 2 Under axioms (L), (D), (M), (S), (I) and (E),
Φv(ki) =
∑
x∈Γ(L−i)
(n− h(x)− 1)!h(x)!
n!
[v(x, ki)− v(x, 0i)], 1 ≤ k ≤ li, i ∈ N,
(23)
where h(x) := |{k ∈ N \ i | xk = ⊤k}|.
Remark that the result is very close to the classical formula of Shapley. For
a formula on more general lattices (but without axiomatization) and for the
interaction index, see [29].
8 The core
8.1 The classical case
In game theory, the core of v is another way to define rational imputations for
players. Specifically, it is a set of imputations such that no subcoalition has
interest to form:
C(v) := {φ ∈ Rn | φ(N) = v(N) and φ(A) ≥ v(A), ∀A ⊆ N} (24)
with φ(A) :=
∑
i∈A φ(i). Otherwise said, it is the set of additive games domi-
nating v and coinciding on N . Whenever nonempty, the core is a convex set. It
is reduced to the singleton {v} if the game is additive.
The same concept exists also in capacity theory. It is seen as the set of
probability measures dominating a given capacity (see properties of the core in
[9]).
A related concept is the Weber set. It is the convex hull of the set M(v) of
marginal worth vectors
W(v) := co(M(v)), (25)
where a marginal worth vector is defined as the increment of v along a maximal
chain in the Boolean lattice 2N . Specifically, to any permutation pi on N , we
associate a maximal chain
Api0 := ∅ ⊂ A
pi
1 := {pi(1)} ⊂ A
pi
2 := {pi(1), pi(2)} ⊂ · · · ⊂ A
pi
n := N (26)
with Apii := {pi(1), . . . , pi(i)}. Then, the corresponding marginal worth vector
xpi(v) is defined by:
xpipi(i)(v) := v(A
pi
i )− v(A
pi
i−1), i = 1, . . . , n. (27)
The following proposition summarizes well-known results. We recall that a
game is convex if v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B) for any A,B ⊆ N .
Proposition 3 Let v be a game on N . The following holds.
(i) C(v) ⊆ W(v).
(ii) C(v) 6= ∅ if v is convex.
(iii) v is convex iff C(v) =W(v) (i.e., the set of marginal worth vectors is the
set of vertices of the core).
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8.2 The case of multichoice games
Here also, several different approaches have been proposed, the first one being
by Faigle [16], see also the works of Tijs et al. [51]. For a detailed comparison
of these previous works with our approach, see [53, 32]. We give below the main
elements of our approach, and the one of Faigle.
v being a multichoice game, we say that v is convex if v(x∨ y) + v(x∧ y) ≥
v(x) + v(y), for all x, y ∈ L, and v is additive if for every x, y ∈ L such that
x ∧ y = ⊥, it holds v(x ∨ y) = v(x) + v(y).
We denote by A(L) the set of additive games on L. The following definition
is a direct transposition of the classical definition.
Definition 6 The precore of a multichoice game v on L is defined by
PC(v) := {φ ∈ A(L) | φ(x) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L, and φ(⊤) = v(⊤)}. (28)
This is in fact the definition of Faigle. However, it is easy to see that the precore,
although convex, is unbounded. Indeed, considering a 2-choice game with two
players, hence L := {0, 1, 2}2, the conditions on φ to be element of the precore
write:
φ(2, 0) + φ(0, 2) = v(2, 2)
φ(1, 0) ≥ v(1, 0)
φ(0, 1) ≥ v(0, 1)
φ(1, 0) + φ(0, 1) ≥ v(1, 1).
Remark that φ(1, 0) and φ(0, 1) may be taken arbitrarily large. We denote by
PCF (v) := co(Ext(PC(v))) the polytope of PC(v), where Ext() is the set of
extreme points (vertices) of some convex set.
To avoid these drawbacks, we propose the next definition, where normaliza-
tion occurs at each level.
Definition 7 The core of a multichoice game v on N is defined as:
C(v) := {φ ∈ A(L) | φ(x) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L,
and φ(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln) = v(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln), k = 1, . . . ,max
j
lj}.
As for the classical case, we introduce marginal worth vectors ψC as the
vectors of increments along maximal chains C in the lattice L. Coordinates of
ψC are denoted by ψCkj , for any player j ∈ N and any level k > 0 in Lj. To any
marginal vector is associated an additive game φC defined by
φCkj :=
k∑
p=1
ψCpj . (29)
The set of all such additive games is called PM(v), and the pre-Weber set
PW(v) is defined as the convex hull of all additive games in PM(v). Con-
sidering only restricted maximal chains in L, i.e., those passing through all
(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln), k = 1, . . . ,maxj lj , we define M(v), the set of all additive
games φC corresponding to marginal worth vectors associated to all restricted
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maximal chains. Then the Weber set W is defined as the convex hull of all
additive games in M(v).
The following has been shown, which generalizes the classical results of Prop.
3.
Proposition 4 Let v be a multichoice games on L. The following holds.
(i) PCF (v) ⊆ PW(v)
(ii) C(v) ⊆ W(v)
(iii) If v is convex, then C(v) =W(v)
(iv) If v is convex, then PCF (v) = PW(v).
9 The entropy
The entropy is a central notion in probability and information theory. The first
attempt to generalize the classical definition of Shannon to the case of capacities
was done by Yager [54], by considering the Shannon entropy of the Shapley
value of the capacity. A slightly different approach was taken by Marichal and
Roubens [43, 42], which turned out to have better properties. In particular, it is
strictly increasing towards the capacity which maximizes entropy. Its expression
for some capacity µ is given below:
HMR(µ) :=
n∑
i=1
∑
S⊆N\i
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
h(µ(S ∪ i)− µ(S)) (30)
where h(x) := −x log x, for x > 0, and h(0) := 0. An important result, due
to Dukhovny [15], shows that the definition of Marichal and Roubens can be
written as an average of classical entropy along maximal chains of the Boolean
lattice 2N , specifically:
HMR(µ) =
1
n!
∑
C∈M(2N )
HS(p
µ,C) (31)
where HS is the Shannon entropy, and p
µ,C the probability induced by the
maximal chain C and the capacity µ, i.e., using the same notations as for Eq.
(12):
pµ,C({i}) = µ(SiC)− µ(S
i
C \ i), i ∈ N (32)
(identical to marginal worth vectors).
Honda and Grabisch have shown that the above definition could be gener-
alized without losing its nice properties for capacities on particular set systems
[34]. Let us consider N a subcollection of 2N . Then we call (N,N ) (or simply
N if no ambiguity occurs) a set system if N contains ∅ and N . A set system
is a particular partially ordered set when endowed with inclusion, hence usual
definitions apply, in particular the notion of maximal chain. We denote the set
of all maximal chains of N byM(N ). (N,N ) is a regular set system if for any
C ∈ M(N ), the length of C is n, i.e. |C| = n+ 1. Equivalently, N is a regular
set system if and only if |A \B| = 1 for any A,B ∈ N such that A ≻ B. Let µ
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be a capacity on (N,N ). For any C ∈ M(2N), define pµ,C by (32) again. Then
the entropy of µ on (N,N ) is given by:
HHG(µ) :=
1
|M(N )|
∑
C∈M(N )
HS(p
µ,C). (33)
HHG is a continuous function of µ, and 0 ≤ HHG ≤ logn, with equality at left
attained if and only if µ is a 0-1 valued capacity, and at right if and only if µ
is the additive uniform capacity. Moreover, HHG is strictly increasing towards
the value of the additive uniform capacity.
The entropy for capacities has been axiomatized by Kojadinovic et al. [37]
using a recursive axiom difficult to interpret. Honda and Grabisch have ax-
iomatized HHG in a different way [33], avoiding such an axiom, and following
Faddeev’s classical axiomatization of Shannon entropy.
10 The case of bipolar structures
Let us come back on bi-capacities and bi-cooperative games. First works on bi-
capacities [23, 25, 26] have taken for granted that these were capacities defined
on the lattice (Q(N),⊑), with (A,A′) ⊑ (B,B′) ⇔ A ⊆ B and A′ ⊇ B′.
Doing so, bi-capacities are indeed monotonic mappings and match the general
definition of capacities on lattices (see Def. 4).
There is nevertheless something discordant in the fact that doing so, since
(Q(N),⊑) is isomorphic to the lattice 3n, bi-cooperative games become in some
sense isomorphic to multichoice games with m = 2, a conclusion which may be
surprising if one consider the interpretation behind them. Let us elaborate on
this last point. We may say that for a 2-choice game, the underlying levels of
participation are naturally labelled 0, 1, 2, with 0 indicating non participation,
1 a mild participation, and 2 a full participation. For bi-cooperative games,
keeping the same labelling leads to something rather odd, since 0 means (full)
participation against, 1 non participation, and 2 (full) participation. Hence, a
more natural labelling would be −1, 0, 1, the 0 value being central, and −1, 1
being symmetric extremes. This suggests that:
(i) the point (∅, ∅) is central in the structure Q(N), although in 3N , (1, . . . , 1)
has no central role;
(ii) bi-cooperative games are not 2-choice games, but rather a symmetrization
of classical cooperative games.
Looking at the definition of the Choquet integral for bi-capacities (Sec. 5), one
can see that it already follows the above principle.
Consequently, the order ⊑ should be replaced by the product order ⊆:
(A,A′) ⊆ (B,B′) ⇔ A ⊆ B A′ ⊆ B′. Interestingly enough, this was the first
definition proposed by Bilbao [3] for the underlying structure of bi-cooperative
games. Now, (Q(N),⊆) is no more a lattice, but an inf-semilattice.
Consequently, a proper definition of the Mo¨bius transform is not the one
proposed in [25], solution of the equation:
v(A,A′) =
∑
(B,B′)⊑(A,A′)
m(B,B′) (34)
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but it should be the solution of the equation:
v(A,A′) =
∑
(B,B′)⊆(A,A′)
m(B,B′) (35)
whose solution is:
m(A,A′) =
∑
B⊆A
B′⊆A′
(−1)|A\B|+|A
′\B′|v(B,B′). (36)
This function m, which could be called the bipolar Mo¨bius transform, has been
first proposed by Fujimoto [19, 20], in order to avoid the complicated expression
of the Choquet integral in terms of the Mo¨bius transform given in [26]. Indeed,
using the (bipolar) Mo¨bius transform, the Choquet integral simply writes:∫
f dv =
∑
(A,A′)∈Q(N)
m(A,A′)
[ ∧
i∈A
f+i ∧
∧
j∈A′
f−j
]
. (37)
The definition of entropy for bi-capacities, as it is given by Kojadinovic and
Marichal [36], follows in fact the same philosophy. It writes:
HKM(v) :=
1
2n
∑
N+⊆N
1
n!
∑
pi∈ΠN
HS(p
v
pi,N+) (38)
where pi is any permutation on N , and pv
pi,N+
is the probability distribution in-
duced by v and the maximal chain induced by pi in the sublattice [(∅, ∅), (N+, N\
N+)].
In summary, bi-capacities and bi-cooperative games should be considered
as a particular symmetrization of capacities and cooperative games, as well as
Q(N) should be considered as a symmetrization of P(N) = 2N . We call this
particular symmetrization bipolar extension, and show now that this can be
made fairly more general [28].
Definition 8 Let (L,≤) be an inf-semilattice with bottom element ⊥. We define
its bipolar extension by
L˜ := {(x, y) | x, y ∈ L, x ∧ y = ⊥}, (39)
which we endow with the product order ≤ on L2.
Clearly, Q(N) = P˜(N). The following holds.
Proposition 5 Let (L,≤) be an inf-semilattice.
(i) (L˜,≤) is an inf-semilattice whose bottom element is (⊥,⊥), where ≤ is
the product order on L2.
(ii) The set of join-irreducible elements of L˜ is
J (L˜) = {(j,⊥) | j ∈ J (L)} ∪ {(⊥, j) | j ∈ J (L)}. (40)
(iii) The Mo¨bius function on L˜ is given by:
µ
L˜
((z, t), (x, y)) = µL(z, x)µL(t, y). (41)
Bipolar extensions have been further investigated in [27], concerning the defini-
tion of the Choquet integral or other aggregation operators on such structures.
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11 Concluding remarks
The above compilation of results shows that the field is quite active, and seems
to be promising. Future directions of research are clearly in the direction of
set systems, in particular what is called regular set systems [34] (see Section
9). A set system is regular if all its maximal chains are of same length. It
can be shown that these structures encompass distributive lattices and convex
geometries, and are therefore fairly general. With regular set systems, all the
usual tools defined here (Choquet integral, Shapley value, entropy, core) can be
defined since all these notions can be defined through maximal chains.
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